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“THE RIGHT OF TRIAL BY JURY SHALL BE PRESERVED”:  
LIMITING THE APPEALABILITY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ORDERS DENYING QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 
Arielle Herzberg* 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent police shootings of unarmed African American teenagers 
in the United States raise, among many other concerns, questions 
about how the American judicial system should address police mis-
conduct.  Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, a police officer 
or any government official sued in his or her personal capacity is im-
mune from suit and liability for damages unless the official’s actions 
violated clearly established constitutional law.1  When a litigant brings 
a constitutional tort action against an official in his personal capacity 
under § 1983,2 one of the first hurdles that the litigant is likely to con-
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 1 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818–19 (1982) (“If the law was clearly established, the 
immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public official 
should know the law governing his conduct.”); see also David Rudovsky, The Qualified Im-
munity Doctrine in the Supreme Court:  Judicial Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional 
Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23, 36 & n.74 (1989) (explaining that the doctrine of qualified 
immunity was a judicially created doctrine and that there is no basis for qualified immun-
ity in the Constitution). 
 2 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by 
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in 
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .”); see also Rudovsky, supra note 1, at 
24–25 (“With the Court’s contemporaneous expansion of substantive constitutional pro-
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front is the official’s motion for summary judgment on the ground of 
qualified immunity.  If a court denies the summary judgment motion, 
finding a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the officer vio-
lated clearly established law,3 the official can sometimes appeal.4  
Thus, the official gets yet another chance at achieving immunity from 
suit, allowing him the opportunity to appear before one trial judge 
and three appellate judges before ever appearing in front of a jury.5 
The appealability standard, however, is confusing, especially be-
cause of the differences between the recent Supreme Court decisions 
in Plumhoff v. Rickard6 and Scott v. Harris,7 and the well-established 
precedents laid out in Johnson v. Jones8 and Mitchell v. Forsyth.9  Before 
2007, the jurisdiction of appellate courts to review summary judg-
ment orders denying qualified immunity was relatively clear:  while 
appellate courts could review questions of law, they could not review 
questions of “‘evidentiary sufficiency,’ i.e. which facts a party may, or 
may not, be able to prove at trial.”10  In 2007, however, the Supreme 
Court in Scott v. Harris reviewed a denial of summary judgment based 
on qualified immunity by focusing on video evidence of a high-speed 
car chase, without any hesitation as to the appellate court’s jurisdic-
tion to review the factual record.11  In 2014, the Supreme Court in 
Plumhoff heard another car chase case, and repeated the approach 
used in Scott—the Court reviewed the factual record and reversed the 
district court’s denial of summary judgment.12  Taken in conjunction, 
 
tections, § 1983 became the statute of choice for the litigation of constitutional tort ac-
tions.” (citations omitted)). 
 3 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that 
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.”). 
 4 This Comment focuses specifically on the appealability of summary judgment orders 
denying qualified immunity.  For an analysis of the appealability of motions to dismiss 
based on qualified immunity, see generally Mark R. Brown, Qualified Immunity and Inter-
locutory Fact-Finding in the Courts of Appeals, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1317 (2010) (discussing 
how Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) expands the limit on appellate fact-finding in 
Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995)). 
 5 U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall 
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a 
jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to 
the rules of the common law.”). 
 6 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014). 
 7 550 U.S. 372 (2007). 
 8 515 U.S. 304 (1995). 
 9 472 U.S. 511 (1985). 
 10 Johnson, 515 U.S. at 313. 
 11 Scott, 550 U.S. at 378. 
 12 Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2020 (“The District Court order here is not materially distinguisha-
ble from the District Court order in Scott v. Harris, and in that case we expressed no 
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Plumhoff and Scott seem to set forth a standard granting broad appel-
late jurisdiction over orders denying qualified immunity, allowing 
appellate courts not only to review questions of law, but also to review 
questions of fact.13  The Supreme Court’s articulation of the appeala-
bility standard in Plumhoff and Scott thus strays significantly from the 
earlier Supreme Court decisions, such as Johnson. 
Given the conflicting case law in Scott and Johnson, do courts have 
jurisdiction to review the factual record on interlocutory appeal of 
summary judgment orders denying qualified immunity?  This Com-
ment addresses several interpretations of what the appealability of 
qualified immunity summary judgment denials should be.  Part I dis-
cusses the conflicting case law on the appealability standard.  Part II 
discusses various appellate courts’ interpretations of how to reconcile 
Johnson and Scott, focusing specifically on a case from the Sixth Cir-
cuit, Romo v. Largen.14  Part III sets forth my own approach, which 
recognizes Johnson as the general rule, with Scott and Plumhoff as nar-
row exceptions.  Part IV discusses counterarguments to my approach 
and Part V responds to these counterarguments. 
While a broad grant of appellate jurisdiction over qualified im-
munity summary judgment denials seems attractive because of its 
promise of coherence, its advantages do not outweigh its drawbacks.  
A broad appealability standard would increase the appellate docket, 
cause unwise use of appellate resources, and delay litigation.  Fur-
thermore, I argue that a broad appellate standard constrains a plain-
tiff’s ability to recover and rarely allows a plaintiff the opportunity to 
appear before a jury.  I will propose, instead, an interpretation that 
simultaneously reconciles Scott and Johnson and sets forth a limited 
appealability standard. 
I. FROM MITCHELL AND JOHNSON TO SCOTT AND PLUMHOFF 
In 1985, the Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Forsyth set forth the rule 
on whether appellate courts had jurisdiction to review qualified im-
munity summary judgment denials:  appellate courts only had juris-
 
doubts about the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under § 1291.  Accordingly, here, as 
in Scott, we hold that the Court of Appeals properly exercised jurisdiction, and we there-
fore turn to the merits.”). 
 13 Id. at 2020–22 (finding appellate jurisdiction to review whether the officers violated peti-
tioner’s Fourth Amendment rights or any clearly established Fourth Amendment rule, 
and relying on the factual record in reversing the district court determination); Scott, 550 
U.S. at 378 (reviewing the district court’s denial of a qualified immunity summary judg-
ment motion by focusing on video evidence). 
 14 Romo v. Largen, 723 F.3d 670 (6th Cir. 2013). 
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diction to review questions of law on interlocutory appeal.15  The 
Mitchell Court began its analysis by placing qualified immunity deter-
minations into the collateral order doctrine, as articulated in Cohen v. 
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.16  In Cohen, the Supreme Court held 
that a district court order could be appealed on an interlocutory basis 
if the order fell within “that small class which finally determine claims 
of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the ac-
tion, too important to be denied review and too independent of the 
cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until 
the whole case is adjudicated.”17  The Cohen doctrine has been broken 
down into three requirements:  the order must “(1) conclusively de-
termine the disputed question, (2) resolve an important issue com-
pletely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) be effectively 
unreviewable on appeal from final judgment.”18 
In Mitchell, the Court held that because the purpose of qualified 
immunity is the right not to stand trial, the doctrine would be un-
dermined if the case were to proceed to final judgment without inter-
locutory appeal.19  Thus, the Mitchell Court held that qualified im-
munity summary judgment denials fulfilled the first and third 
requirements of the Cohen test:  they are “effectively unreviewable on 
appeal from a final judgment” and interlocutory appeals would “con-
clusively determine the disputed question.”20 
In determining that qualified immunity appeals meet the second 
Cohen requirement of presenting “a claim of rights separable from, 
and collateral to, rights asserted in the action,” the Supreme Court 
had to engage in a more complex analysis.  It used this opportunity to 
limit the appealability of qualified immunity to situations in which 
“the appealable issue is a purely legal one:  whether the facts alleged 
(by the plaintiff, or, in some cases, the defendant) support a claim of 
violation of clearly established law.”21  The Mitchell Court acknowl-
edged that in determining the legal question in qualified immunity 
appeals, the appellate court would often be forced to consider the 
plaintiff’s factual allegations.22  The Court concluded, however, that 
although the appellate court would likely need to consider facts in its 
 
 15 472 U.S. at 527–28, 528 n.9. 
 16 Id. at 524–30 (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)). 
 17 Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). 
 18 Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 310 (1995) (quoting Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer 
Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993)). 
 19 Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526–28. 
 20 Id. at 527. 
 21 Id. at 528 n.9. 
 22 Id. at 528. 
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interlocutory review, the legal questions raised would cause the ques-
tion on review to be separate enough from the merits of the underly-
ing action to fit within the Cohen separability requirement.23  Since the 
decision in Mitchell, courts have placed appeals of qualified immunity 
summary judgment denials within the collateral order doctrine.24 
Scholars have reasoned that “[t]he [Mitchell] decision makes sense 
only as a determination that the need to protect officials against the 
burdens of further pretrial proceedings and trial justifies a clear de-
parture from ordinary concepts of finality, including the ordinary re-
quirements of the collateral order doctrine.”25  Indeed, the Mitchell 
Court explained the importance of protecting government officials:  
qualified immunity “is an immunity from suit rather than a mere de-
 
 23 Id. at 528–29 (internal citations omitted) (“To be sure, the resolution of these legal issues 
will entail consideration of the factual allegations that make up the plaintiff’s claim for re-
lief; the same is true, however, when a court must consider whether a prosecution is 
barred by a claim of former jeopardy or whether a Congressman is absolutely immune 
from suit because the complained of conduct falls within the protections of the Speech 
and Debate Clause.  In the case of a double jeopardy claim, the court must compare the 
facts alleged in the second indictment with those in the first to determine whether the 
prosecutions are for the same offense, while in evaluating a claim of immunity under the 
Speech and Debate Clause, a court must analyze the plaintiff’s complaint to determine 
whether the plaintiff seeks to hold a Congressman liable for protected legislative actions 
or for other, unprotected conduct.  In holding these and similar issues of absolute im-
munity to be appealable under the collateral order doctrine, the Court has recognized 
that a question of immunity is separate from the merits of the underlying action for pur-
poses of the Cohen test even though a reviewing court must consider the plaintiff’s factual 
allegations in resolving the immunity issue.”). 
 24 But see Edmund L. Carey, Jr., Note, Quick Termination of Insubstantial Civil Rights Claims:  
Qualified Immunity and Procedural Fairness, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1543, 1584 (1985) (advocating 
that certified interlocutory appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) are a “superior alternative” 
to the use of the collateral order doctrine for interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity 
summary judgment denials).  While Carey’s approach both seems to resolve the problem 
that qualified immunity might not meet the separability requirement of the collateral or-
der doctrine and ensures that only controversial questions of law are appealable, his ap-
proach has its own shortcomings.  First, appealability would simply depend on whether 
the district court and appellate court approved the appeal.  This discretionary decision 
would likely vary in different districts and different circuits, only adding to the confusion.  
More importantly, there is no indication that the  Court is looking to abrogate all of the 
existing precedent placing qualified immunity appeals within the collateral order doc-
trine.  Carey’s approach would make a previous body of case law on the appealability of 
qualified immunity denials irrelevant.  The Mitchell, Jones, and Scott cases, to start, would 
become immaterial.  Although Carey’s approach has strengths, the Court will likely not 
abandon its precedent of placing of qualified immunity appeals within the collateral or-
der doctrine. 
 25 15A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3914.10 (2d ed. 
1991); see also Mark R. Brown, The Fall and Rise of Qualified Immunity:  From Hope to Scott, 9 
NEV. L.J. 185, 195 (2008) (describing qualified immunity as a “prophylactic to protect” of-
ficials from standing trial when they did not violate clearly established constitutional 
rights). 
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fense to liability; and like absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a 
case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.”26  Thus, the Court took 
steps to ensure that officials got a second chance to be granted quali-
fied immunity on appeal, in order to free up officials to do their gov-
ernment duties, rather than be distracted by litigation matters.27 
The Mitchell holding was clarified ten years later in Johnson v. Jones.  
In that case, Jones, a diabetic who was arrested while having an insu-
lin seizure, claimed that police officers beat him during his arrest.28  
Jones claimed that the police officers used excessive force because 
they believed he was intoxicated.29  Jones therefore sued five police 
officers under § 1983, three of whom claimed that they were not at 
the scene where the alleged beating occurred.30  Despite their claims, 
the district court found that there was enough circumstantial evi-
dence to support Jones’s contention that the three officers were in 
fact at the scene.31 Invoking Mitchell, a unanimous Supreme Court 
held that appellate courts had no jurisdiction to review which facts a 
party may or may not be able to prove at trial.32  Rather, appellate 
courts may only review the appeals of qualified immunity summary 
judgment decisions “‘to the extent that [they] turn[] on an issue of 
law.’”33  The Johnson Court explained that questions of fact, such as 
the one presented in this case, do not meet the separability require-
ment of the collateral order doctrine set forth in Cohen v. Beneficial 
Industrial Loan Corp.34  Furthermore, the Court expressed that appeal-
ability of factual questions would lead to litigation delays and repeti-
 
 26 Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526. 
 27 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009) (“The basic thrust of the qualified-
immunity doctrine is to free officials from the concerns of litigation, including ‘avoidance 
of disruptive discovery.’”); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816–17 (1982) (explaining 
that one of the policies behind qualified immunity is ensuring that capable individuals 
are not deterred from government jobs because of the threat of litigation); see also 
Kathryn R. Urbonya, Interlocutory Appeals from Orders Denying Qualified Immunity:  Determin-
ing the Proper Scope of Appellate Jurisdiction, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 52 (1998) (“In theory, 
qualified immunity benefits society.  It allows officials to work instead of being tied up in 
legal proceedings.”). 
 28 515 U.S. 304, 307 (1995). 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at 308. 
 32 Id. at 313. 
 33 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 34 Id. at 314–15 (“Where, however, a defendant simply wants to appeal a district court’s de-
termination that the evidence is sufficient to permit a particular finding of fact after trial, 
it will often prove difficult to find any such ‘separate’ question—one that is significantly 
different from the fact-related legal issues that likely underlie the plaintiff’s claim on the 
merits . . . . To take what petitioners call a small step beyond Mitchell . . . would more than 
relax the separability requirement—it would in many cases simply abandon it.”). 
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tive review by an appellate court that has less expertise than a district 
court in determining whether genuine issues of fact exist for the pur-
pose of determining summary judgment.35  In sum, as laid out in 
Mitchell and Johnson, an appellate court only had jurisdiction to hear 
qualified immunity appeals that turned on issues of law, not those 
based on facts related to the sufficiency of evidence. 
The Johnson Court considered two possible problems with its ap-
proach.  First, the Court responded to a concern that lawyers may 
add meritless legal questions to qualified immunity appeals that really 
turn on factual questions simply to ensure that the appellate court 
would review the order.36  The Court suggested that this would not be 
a serious problem, though, because the appellate courts will be able 
to recognize such behavior.37  The Johnson Court thus predicted that 
courts of appeals were not likely to exercise pendent appellate juris-
diction to expand the scope of their appellate authority.38  Finally, 
Appellate Rule 38 is likely to deter frivolous appeals.39 
A second concern, which the Johnson Court took more seriously, 
was that appellate courts would be forced to undergo a “cumber-
some” review of the record when a district court did not state the 
facts upon which it relied in making a summary judgment decision.40  
The Johnson Court explained that an occasional review of the record 
is “still, from a practical point of view, more manageable than” allow-
ing review of the factual record in every qualified immunity appeal.41  
The Supreme Court expanded on Johnson in its 1996 Behrens v. Pelle-
 
 35 Id. at 315–17. 
 36 Id. at 318; see also Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 51 (1995) (stating in 
dicta that courts of appeals can exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction if two decisions 
are “inextricably intertwined” or “review of the former decision was necessary to ensure 
meaningful review of the latter”); Joan Steinman, The Scope of Appellate Jurisdiction:  Pendent 
Appellate Jurisdiction Before and After Swint, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1337, 1452–56 (1998) (arguing 
that courts often conclude that qualified immunity appeals meet the requirements of 
Swint for pendent appellate jurisdiction to apply). 
 37 Johnson, 515 U.S. at 318. 
 38 Id. (“Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that it may sometimes be appropriate to 
exercise ‘pendent appellate jurisdiction’ over such a matter . . . it seems unlikely that 
courts of appeals would do so in a case where the appealable issue appears simply a 
means to lead the court to review the underlying factual matter . . . .” (citing Natale v. 
Ridgefield, 927 F.2d 101, 104 (CA2 1991) (explaining that pendent appellate jurisdiction 
should only be invoked in “exceptional circumstances”))).  The significance of pendent 
appellate jurisdiction will be further discussed infra Part V. 
 39 FED. R. APP. P. 38 (“If a court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may, 
after a separately filed motion or notice from the court and reasonable opportunity to re-
spond, award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee.”). 
 40 Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319. 
 41 Id. 
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tier42 decision, holding that appellate courts have jurisdiction to re-
view facts if the district court did not lay out the facts that it relied 
upon in its determination that the conduct violated clearly estab-
lished law.43 
Then, in 2007, the Supreme Court seemed to set forth a new 
standard of appealability for qualified immunity summary judgment 
denials.  In Scott v. Harris, the Supreme Court decided an appeal of a 
summary judgment order denying qualified immunity by reviewing 
the record, and thus implied that an appellate court could review is-
sues of fact, at least in some circumstances.44  The Scott Court held 
that an officer acted reasonably after the Court reviewed the officer’s 
actions in a video of a high-speed car chase.45  The Court rationalized 
its use of record evidence by stating:  “When opposing parties tell two 
different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, 
so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt 
that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for sum-
mary judgment.”46  Here, however, the Supreme Court seemed to ob-
scure the standard laid out in Mitchell and Johnson.  Although these 
previous cases held that the appellate court could not fact-find in a 
qualified immunity appeal, the Scott Court implied that the appellate 
court may engage in fact-finding at times.47  Furthermore, the Scott 
Court never mentioned any jurisdictional problems in finding facts.48 
In 2014, the Supreme Court stated in Plumhoff v. Rickard that the 
lack of discussion of jurisdiction in Scott was due to the fact that “[the 
Court] expressed no doubts about the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Appeals under § 1291.”49  The Plumhoff Court interpreted Scott to hold 
that “an immediate appeal may be taken to challenge ‘blatantly and 
demonstrably false’ factual determinations.”50  Furthermore, the 
Plumhoff Court distinguished the case before it from that of Johnson by 
suggesting that the issue in Plumhoff turned on legal questions of 
whether the officer’s conduct violated the Fourth Amendment and 
clearly established law, rather than a factual question of whether the 
 
 42 516 U.S. 299  (1996). 
 43 Id. at 313. 
 44 Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378–81 (2007). 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 380–81. 
 47 Id. at 377–78. 
 48 Brown, supra note 25, at 220–21 (arguing that the Supreme Court did not hesitate in find-
ing jurisdiction because the video evidence was clearer than evidence in other cases). 
 49 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2020 (2014). 
 50 Id. at 2018 (citations omitted). 
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officer was at the scene and responsible for the conduct.51  The Plum-
hoff Court ultimately held that officers acted reasonably in terminat-
ing a high-speed car chase by firing fifteen shots into the suspect’s 
vehicle.52  Thus, after Scott and Plumhoff, appellate courts no longer 
needed to take the plaintiff’s facts as true and only review legal ques-
tions with regard to qualified immunity denials, but they could look 
at the factual record in certain instances. 
II. DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE APPEALABILITY STANDARD 
The conflicting case law leaves appellate courts with a confusing 
framework for determining whether or not they may review facts.  
Appellate courts have thus had difficulty defining the appealability 
standard for qualified immunity summary judgment denials in a way 
that is consistent with both Scott v. Harris and Johnson v. Jones.  While 
some courts have limited the applicability of Scott, other courts advo-
cate a narrow reading of Johnson. 
Professor Mark Brown argues that most appellate courts do not 
view Scott as a “blank check” permitting them to engage in fact-
finding, but instead construe the case narrowly. 53  His survey of ap-
pellate courts demonstrates that most continue to defer to the district 
courts’ determinations of whether a genuine issue of material fact ex-
ists.54  Some courts have thus explicitly limited the holding of Scott to 
cases with video evidence55 or to situations in which the facts alleged 
by the plaintiff are blatantly contradicted by the record.56  Neverthe-
less, some judges have interpreted Scott as an invalidation of Johnson.  
 
 51 Id. at 2019. 
 52 Id. at 2022. 
 53 Brown, supra note 4, at 1323 (“Even though it obviously created tension with Johnson v. 
Jones, Scott was generally given a limited reach by the Courts of Appeals.  It was not gener-
ally treated as a blank check to engage in de novo fact-finding.  Rather, district courts’ 
findings of genuine issues of material fact continued to draw deference and respect on 
interlocutory appeal.”). 
 54 Id. 
 55 See, e.g., Mecham v. Frazier, 500 F.3d 1200, 1202 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Scott v. Harris to 
suggest that the facts in this case were relatively uncontested because there was video evi-
dence, and thus the appellate court could rely on these “essentially undisputed” facts). 
 56 See, e.g., Bass v. Goodwill, 356 F. App’x 110, 115 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that the court 
lacked jurisdiction to review an appeal because unlike in Scott v. Harris, the plaintiff’s evi-
dence here was not blatantly contradicted by the record); see also Sweat v. Shelton, 595 F. 
App’x 508, 511–12 (6th Cir. 2014) (explaining that there is a narrow exception to evalu-
ating the factual record when there are blatantly contradictory facts); Roberson v. Torres, 
770 F.3d 398, 402 (6th Cir. 2014) (“[A] court of appeals would appear to have jurisdic-
tion over so related a question as whether the district court properly adopted the plain-
tiff’s version of the facts for purposes of ruling on the issue of qualified immunity.”). 
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For example, in a Tenth Circuit case, Price-Cornelison v. Brooks, Judge 
Terrence L. O’Brien’s partial dissent and partial concurrence, sug-
gested that the Johnson rule may be a “dead letter” after Scott.57  He ar-
gued that in light of Scott, an appellate court does have jurisdiction to 
review a district court’s determination that the evidence was sufficient 
to deny a summary judgment order based on qualified immunity.58 
The two sides of the dispute are demonstrated in Romo v. Largen, a 
Sixth Circuit case.59  In Romo, Officer Largen arrested Romo for driv-
ing while intoxicated.60  Officer Largen  claimed that he saw a similar 
car to Romo’s driving recklessly a few minutes before arresting Ro-
mo.61  Romo, on the other hand, insisted that he was not driving but 
sleeping in his car.62  Romo brought a § 1983 suit, claiming that the 
officer lacked probable cause for the arrest.63  The district court de-
nied Officer Largen’s motion for summary judgment based on quali-
fied immunity, finding that there were genuine questions of material 
fact.64 
The Sixth Circuit majority affirmed the district court, explaining 
that because of the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson, the appel-
late court was required to accept the district court’s determination 
that genuine issues of material fact existed for purposes of denying a 
motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.65  Fur-
thermore, the Romo majority explained a complicated set of prece-
dent, and concluded that “[t]his limitation is not prudential, option-
al, or discretionary.  It derives from the limited nature of our 
interlocutory appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 as inter-
preted in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.  The limitation is in 
that sense ‘jurisdictional.’”66  The Sixth Circuit suggested that the on-
ly time it would be permitted to review a district court’s determina-
tion as to whether a genuine issue of fact exists is when the trial 
 
 57 524 F.3d 1103, 1119 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008) (O’Brien, J., concurring). 
 58 Id. 
 59 723 F.3d 670 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 60 Id. at 672. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 671. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 674 (“In adjudicating this appeal, we are required by the limitations on interlocuto-
ry appeals of qualified immunity denials to accept the district court’s finding that a genu-
ine dispute of material fact existed as to whether Largen fabricated the whole or a part of 
his story about seeing a Dodge Ram pickup pass a semi tanker, and we refuse to consider 
Largen’s factual disputations to the contrary.”). 
 66 Id. at 674 n.2 (citations omitted). 
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court’s determination is clearly contradicted by the record.67  The ap-
pellate court thus suggested that “[Scott] is easily limited as an excep-
tion for blatantly contradicted facts[,]” and suggested that Scott 
should not “swallow” the rule set forth in Johnson.68  Suggesting that 
there was no blatant contradiction in the case before it, the Romo ma-
jority explained that the appellate court did not have jurisdiction to 
review the determination that there were genuine issues of material 
fact.69 
In his partial concurrence, Judge Jeffrey Sutton sharply disagreed 
with the majority’s appealability interpretation and attempted to rec-
oncile Johnson with Scott in a different way.70  Judge Sutton suggested 
that Johnson be read narrowly, and that an appellate court need only 
accept a district court’s interpretation of the facts in cases similar to 
Johnson, where the defendants refuse to accept the truth of the plain-
tiff’s evidence.71  The appellate court, according to Judge Sutton, had 
jurisdiction on interlocutory appeal to review all other inferences 
made by the trial court, and the rule prohibiting review of sufficiency-
of-the-evidence questions applied only in cases where officials claim 
to not have done what the plaintiff alleged.72 
Judge Sutton supported his argument using Scott, where the Su-
preme Court reviewed and reversed the district court’s determination 
that a genuine dispute existed.73  In order to interpret Scott correctly, 
Judge Sutton concluded that an appellate court must be able to re-
view a district court’s inferences.74  Judge Sutton criticized the Romo 
majority’s suggestion that Scott was limited to cases in which there was 
a blatant contradiction between the facts adopted and those in the 
record, by suggesting that the majority created “distinctions [between 
Johnson and Scott] that are not driven by meaningful differences.”75  
He argued that the only way for an appellate court to determine 
whether the record blatantly contradicted a district court’s determi-
 
 67 Id. at 674 n.3. 
 68 Id. at 675 & n.3. 
 69 Id. at 674 n.2 (“[W]e are ruling on what is properly before us, and [we] say[] nothing 
about what is jurisdictionally not before us.”). 
 70 Id. at 677. 
 71 Id. at 677–78. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. at 678–80. 
 74 Id.  
 75 Id. at 679. 
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nation is by reviewing the record, implying that the majority’s opin-
ion was based in circular reasoning.76 
Although Judge Sutton’s approach is attractive because it allows 
appellate courts to fact-find and thus makes the appealability stand-
ard seem more uniform across cases, I agree with the majority’s view 
that (for the purposes of interlocutory appellate review) appellate 
courts should accept district court determinations of whether there is 
a genuine issue of fact.  I argue that there should only be three cir-
cumstances when an official can appeal a qualified immunity sum-
mary judgment denial: first, when the appeal turns on a question of 
law; second, when the district court does not explain the facts it re-
lied upon; and third, when the record is blatantly contradicted.  Be-
low, I set forth my own test for whether or not a court of appeals has 
jurisdiction to review facts in qualified immunity summary judgment 
appeals.  I also present the counterarguments posed by Judge Sutton 
and respond to them. 
III.  MY APPROACH:  A LIMITED APPEALABILITY STANDARD 
I argue that Johnson v. Jones should be read broadly.  This view, 
however, does not make the Scott v. Harris and Plumhoff v. Rickard de-
cisions any less relevant to the appealability standard.  I argue that all 
of these decisions can be reconciled and, in fact, complement one 
another.  To start, Johnson explicitly discussed that in certain circum-
stances, appellate courts have the jurisdiction to engage in a cumber-
some review of the record.77  If the district court does not state the 
facts upon which it relied in making its determination, the appellate 
court can, and should, review the record.78  This proposition was re-
emphasized by the court in Behrens.79  I believe that this statement 
creates an exception, in which courts of appeals can review facts in 
two situations:  (1) when a district court does not state the facts upon 
which it relied, and (2) when the district court states the wrong facts.  
Under this interpretation of Johnson’s dicta and Behrens’s holding, ap-
pellate courts have jurisdiction in cases like Scott and Plumhoff to re-
view the factual record because both cases represent those rare in-
stances in which the district court relied upon a blatantly incorrect 
 
 76 Id. (explaining that regardless of whether Scott v. Harris is read narrowly or broadly, the 
appellate court will need to review record evidence “to assure itself that the district court 
did not blatantly contradict the record”). 
 77 515 U.S. at 319. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Behrens, 516 U.S. at 313 (citing Johnson). 
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set of facts.  The Johnson Court explained that allowing an occasional 
review of the record is, from a practical perspective, more workable 
than making an evidence-based review the required rule in every in-
terlocutory review of a summary judgment order denying qualified 
immunity.80  A limited appealability standard would thus ensure that 
most appeals were only decided on issues of law, keeping the stand-
ard close to the well-established precedent in Johnson, but including 
necessary exceptions for cases like Scott and Plumhoff. 
The limited appealability standard described above would be easy 
to apply and still adhere to precedent.  For example, if the Romo ma-
jority had applied the test I set forth above, they would have been 
able to set forth a simplified approach.  Rather than presenting con-
fusing precedent and picking and choosing when it applied, the 
court would start by asking three questions in order to determine 
whether the appellate court had jurisdiction.  First, the court would 
ask whether the issue on review is a question of law.  In Romo, the 
question on appeal was not a question of law—it did not ask about 
the content of clearly established law.  Rather, the appeal was about a 
much more factual question:  whether Officer Largen saw Romo driv-
ing or whether Officer Largen made the whole thing up.  The second 
question the Romo appellate court would need to ask is whether the 
district court in Romo stated the facts on which it relied.  As pre-
scribed in Behrens, if the district court did not state its assumptions, 
then the appellate court would be able to review the record.  Here, 
however, the Romo district court did lay out its analysis, stating that 
there was a genuine dispute as to whether Romo was indeed driving, 
and if he was not, no reasonable officer would be able to arrest a 
sleeping person in a car without violating clearly established law.81  
Third, the court would ask whether the district court relied on facts 
that are blatantly contradicted in the record, to clear the exceptions 
outlined in Scott and Plumhoff.  This would not require an in-depth 
record review, because these contradictions would need to be blatant 
and easily identifiable by the court of appeals.  In Romo, there is no 
indication that the facts adopted by the district dourt blatantly con-
tradicted the record:  there is a dispute based on what the facts were, 
 
 80 Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319 (“Regardless, this circumstance does not make a critical differ-
ence to our result, for a rule that occasionally requires a detailed evidence-based review of 
the record is still, from a practical point of view, more manageable than the rule that peti-
tioners urge us to adopt.  Petitioners’ approach would make that task, not the exception, 
but the rule.”). 
 81 Romo, 723 F.3d at 674–75 (“No reasonable office would believe that he could constitu-
tionally arrest a person found sleeping . . . for drunk driving . . . .”). 
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but the district dourt considered multiple possible scenarios based on 
the known facts.82  Furthermore, there is no clear video evidence that 
makes any one of those scenarios impossible.  Based on the answers 
to the three questions above, the court would not have jurisdiction to 
review the district court’s denial of summary judgment and would 
need to affirm. 
IV.  COUNTERARGUMENTS TO MY APPROACH 
My approach, however, has its shortcomings.  First, under my ap-
proach, appellate courts will need to continue line drawing between 
questions of fact and questions of law in order to determine jurisdic-
tion.  According to Judge Sutton, this inquiry is cumbersome and dif-
ficult.83  To be sure, some questions are relatively pure questions of 
law.  For example, if there is no dispute about historical facts, but the 
dispute between parties turns on whether the relevant law was clearly 
established at the time the officer took action, the question can be 
considered one purely of law.84  However, the qualified immunity 
question can be more mixed in qualified immunity cases, when the 
court must analyze whether it would have been clear to a reasonable 
officer under the circumstances that he was violating the law.85  Such 
a question relies heavily on the specific facts of a case.86 
 
 82 Id. at 673 (“The district court determined that there were ‘at least three basic narratives 
possible from what’s going on here.’”). 
 83 Id. at 681 (“At first glance, the reader might think that separating authority to review law-
based appeals from authority to review fact-based appeals is easy.  It is not.”). 
 84 Mitchell, 472 U.S. at  528 & n.9. 
 85 Most circuits do not provide model jury instructions for qualified immunity determina-
tions, assuming that the judge, not the jury, should make the qualified immunity deci-
sion.  See, e.g., PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CASES OF EXCESSIVE FORCE IN VIOLATION 
OF THE FOURTH, EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF 
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT § 1.1, at 7 n.8 (CHAMBERS 
OF JUDGE HORBY, Draft 2011), http://www.rid.uscourts.gov; NINTH CIRCUIT MANUAL OF 
MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS:  CIVIL § 9.26 cmt. (NINTH CIRCUIT JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
COMMITTEE 2006), http://www.akd.uscourts.gov/docs/general/model_jury_civil.pdf; 
CIVIL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 5.1 annots. and cmts. (ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
COMMITTEE 2013), http://www.gasd.uscourts.gov/pdf/
2013PatternJuryInstructions(Civil).pdf.   
   Several other circuits suggest that rather than having juries decide on whether quali-
fied immunity should be granted, courts should submit interrogatories to juries on ques-
tions of historical fact to help the judge then decide the qualified immunity question.  See, 
e.g., INSTRUCTIONS FOR CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS UNDER SECTION 1983 § 4.7.2 (THIRD CIRCUIT 
2014), http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/model-civil-jury-table-contents-and-instructions; 
FEDERAL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT § 7.18 cmts. (COMMITTEE ON 
PATTERN CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTION OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT  2009), http://www.ca7.
uscourts.gov/Pattern_Jury_Instr/7th_civ_instruc_2009.pdf).  The Fifth Circuit has a 
model jury instruction on qualified immunity, but in comments it acknowledges that in-
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Judge Sutton noted that trial judges do not usually explicitly dif-
ferentiate between facts and inferences, and that the majority’s ap-
proach would require appellate courts to make “will-o’-the-wisp dis-
tinction[s]” between unreviewable factual inferences and reviewable 
legal conclusions.87  Aside from its one exception, Judge Sutton’s in-
terpretation would presume appealability, removing the fact-law di-
chotomy from the appealability standard.  As Judge Sutton has ex-
plained, his interpretation is advantageous because “it should not go 
unmentioned that additional litigation over appealability, an inevita-
ble outcome of any uncertainty over the scope of it, adds to appellate 
work loads.”88  Judge Sutton argues that interlocutory review can also 
conclude the case earlier, lead to settlement, and prevent a later ap-
peal.89  In turn, Judge Sutton concluded that appellate courts should 
presume jurisdiction to review summary judgment qualified immuni-
ty denials and only do not retain this jurisdiction in the narrow in-
stance when the defendant refuses to accept the truth of the plain-
tiff’s allegations.90  Therefore, Judge Sutton preferred to avoid line 
drawing and advocated a broad appealability standard, so that quali-
fied immunity summary judgment denials are, on a categorical basis, 
appealable. 91 
A similar counterargument that Judge Sutton raised relates to the 
ability of courts of appeals to invoke pendent appellate jurisdiction.  
Judge Sutton argued that because of pendent appellate jurisdiction, 
non-appealable questions will appear before the appellate panel any-
way, making a limited appealability standard useless.92  Judge Sutton 
argued that because qualified immunity questions often rely on 
mixed questions of law and fact, the issues are almost always “inextri-
 
structing the jury of qualified immunity is not the favored mechanism.  JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL CASES) § 10.3, at 92 n.1 (COMMITTEE ON PATTERN JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS DISTRICT JUDGES ASSOCIATION: FIFTH CIRCUIT 2014), 
http://www.lb5.uscourts.gov/juryinstructions/fifth/2014civil.pdf. 
 86 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 674 (2009) (“Though determining whether there is a 
genuine issue of material fact at summary judgment is a question of law, it is a legal ques-
tion that sits near the law-fact divide . . . .”). 
 87 Romo, 723 F.3d at 685 (Sutton, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). 
 88 Id. at 686. 
 89 Id. at 683. 
 90 Id. at 681–82. 
 91 Id. at 683. 
 92 Id. at 682 (“But in our circuit and, best I can tell, in most circuits, the test for pendent 
appellate jurisdiction—whether the two issues are ‘inextricably intertwined,’—will not be 
demanding in the context of a qualified immunity appeal and thus will not require 
gamesmanship to put all issues in front of the appellate court.” (citations omitted)). 
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cably intertwined” so that pendent appellate jurisdiction can be 
used.93 
In addition, Judge Sutton’s approach would fit qualified immunity 
appeals more clearly within the collateral order doctrine.  The Su-
preme Court has held, since Mitchell, that qualified immunity appeals 
are among the classes of cases that fit within the collateral order doc-
trine, yet the majority’s interpretation of appealability decisions 
seems to depend on a case-by-case determination of whether the ap-
peal poses questions of law or calls for an examination of the record.94  
Judge Sutton’s interpretation would allow qualified immunity sum-
mary judgment denials to be appealed as a category, consistent with 
the Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Corp. formulation for collateral orders 
to consist of a “small category of cases,” rather than a case-by-case 
analysis.  Judge Sutton explained: 
“Making appealability depend upon . . . factor[s] particular to the case at 
hand[] would violate the principle . . . that appealability determinations 
are made for classes of decisions not individual orders in specific cases.”  
By making jurisdiction turn on the facts in every case, every case will be-
come a class of an appealable or a non-appealable decision unto itself.95 
Thus, he argues that if the entire class of cases were reviewable, the 
standard of appealability would be uniform.  Additionally, if the class 
of cases were always reviewable, courts would encourage an additional 
judicial look at the constitutional question in a case, which, if nothing 
else, can help ensure accuracy. 
V. RESPONSES TO THESE COUNTERARGUMENTS 
Despite the coherence that Judge Sutton’s approach would pro-
vide to the appealability standard, the disadvantages of his interpreta-
tion outweigh its advantages.  First, I respond to Judge Sutton’s ar-
gument that the limited appealability standard is useless because of 
pendent appellate jurisdiction.  Next, I argue that Judge Sutton’s 
broad appealability standard would lead to an increased appellate 
 
 93 Id. at 682–83. 
 94 See Johnson, 515 U.S. at 307, 315–16 (“We of course decide appealability for categories of 
orders rather than individual orders.  Thus, we do not now in each individual case engage 
in ad hoc balancing to decide issues of appealability.  But, that does not mean that, in de-
lineating appealable categories, we should not look to ‘the competing considerations un-
derlying all questions of finality—“the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review on 
the one hand and the danger of denying justice by delay on the other.”’  And, those con-
siderations, which we discussed above . . . argue against extending Mitchell to encompass 
orders of the kind before us.” (citations omitted)). 
 95 Romo, 723 F.3d at 683 (Sutton, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (alterations in 
original) (citation omitted) (quoting Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 312 (1996)). 
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docket, litigation delays, and a waste of appellate resources.  Addi-
tionally, his approach would constrain plaintiffs’ abilities to recover 
from constitutional violations and make it more difficult for plaintiffs 
to appear before juries. 
First, Judge Sutton’s prediction that pendent appellate jurisdic-
tion will allow a court of appeals to review the entire record is a mis-
application of the precedent laid out in Swint v. Chambers Commission 
Committee96 and Johnson.  In Swint, the Court, in dicta, stated that pen-
dent appellate jurisdiction could be exercised if the non-appealable 
question is “inextricably intertwined” with the appealable question, 
meaning that the “former decision was necessary to ensure meaning-
ful review of the latter.”97  Courts were instructed to use pendent ap-
pellate jurisdiction only when consideration of the non-appealable 
question is “essential.”98  In Johnson, therefore, the Court explained 
that courts of appeals are not likely to invoke pendent appellate ju-
risdiction in reviewing qualified immunity summary judgment denials 
because pendent appellate jurisdiction should only apply in “compel-
ling” or “exceptional” circumstances.99  Although courts of appeals 
continue to use the pendent appellate jurisdiction doctrine explicitly 
and implicitly,100 legal scholars criticize the use of pendent appellate 
jurisdiction in the qualified immunity context.101  The use of pendent 
appellate jurisdiction has a number of disadvantages: it raises costs to 
the appellate system as a whole; it poses a risk that appellate courts 
will meddle with trial court jurisdiction; it raises the prospect of 
wasteful review if the issue disappears by the end of the proceeding; it 
places an extra burden on the parties to argue the appeal; and it al-
lows for the review of issues that should not be individually appeala-
 
 96 Swint v. Chambers Comm’n Comm., 514 U.S. 35 (1995). 
 97 Id. at 51. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id.  at 318 (“Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that it may sometimes be appropri-
ate to exercise ‘pendent appellate jurisdiction’ over such a matter, it seems unlikely that 
courts of appeals would do so in a case where the appealable issue appears simply a 
means to lead the court to review the underlying factual matter.” (citations omitted)).  
The Johnson Court cited other cases in support of this proposition, such as Natale v. 
Ridgefield, 927 F.2d 101, 104 (2d Cir. 1991) (explaining that pendent appellate jurisdic-
tion should only be invoked in “exceptional circumstances”) and United States ex. rel. Val-
ders Stone & Marble, Inc. v. C-Way Constr. Co., 909 F.2d 259, 262 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding 
that courts should use pendent appellate jurisdiction only when there are “compelling 
reasons” to do so).  Johnson, 515 U.S. at 318. 
100 See 16 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3937 (3d ed. 
2012) (stating that courts continue to use the pendent appellate jurisdiction doctrine). 
101 See, e.g., Rudovsky, supra note 1, at 71 (arguing that pendent appellate jurisdiction is likely 
to “entangle the appellate courts in unjustified and unnecessary appeals.”). 
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ble.102  Because appellate courts recognize these costs associated with 
pendent appellate jurisdiction, it should be invoked rarely.  Thus, the 
doctrine should not pose as big a threat to the limited appealability 
standard as Judge Sutton contends.  Courts of appeals will easily de-
tect when such arguments are meritless and inserted just for the pur-
pose of making the order reviewable.  Appellate Rule 38 will also de-
ter defendants from making this argument when it is frivolous.103 
Next, Judge Sutton’s approach would cause the appellate court 
system to become overburdened.  Although one could argue that ap-
pellate review of all qualified immunity denials may increase the 
chances of accurate judicial decision-making, Professor Mark Brown 
suggests that the potential accuracy gain “is rarely worth all the 
costs.”104  Brown analogizes the final judgment rule to an instant re-
play in sports: 
If [the accuracy] were [worth the costs], referees and umpires would al-
ways be staring at instant replays.  Coaches would be given unlimited 
“challenge” flags.  Games would never end.  Whether in sports or law, so-
ciety recognizes that accuracy must be balanced against temporal costs, 
the price of additional personnel, and the benefit of orderly process-
es. . . .  Like it or not, interlocutory appeal is frowned upon because it is 
disruptive, time-consuming and costly.  Interlocutory fact-finding, as rec-
ognized in Johnson v. Jones, is even more so.105 
As Brown mentions, the Johnson Court recognized that appellate re-
view of the factual record “can consume inordinate amounts of appel-
late time” and that the appellate court “may well be faced with ap-
proximately the same factual issue again, after trial.”106  Judge Sutton’s 
recommendation that the appellate court engage in a repetitive fac-
tual analysis for each case, therefore, leads to delay. 
Additionally, Judge Sutton’s approach would lead to a wasteful use 
of appellate resources because his approach ignores the fact that dis-
trict courts are better positioned to make factual determinations on 
qualified immunity summary judgment decisions.  District judges are 
more experienced than appellate judges at determining whether a 
genuine issue of fact exists for purposes of summary judgment be-
 
102 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 100, § 3937 (arguing that the use of pendent appellate ju-
risdiction increases the costs to the appellate system). 
103 See FED. R. APP. P. 38 (stating that the court of appeals may award costs to the appellee 
under certain conditions if the court has determined that the appeal is frivolous). 
104 Brown, supra note 4, at 1330 (arguing that the potential improvements to the accuracy of 
judicial decision making are rarely worth the costs of appellate review of all qualified im-
munity denials). 
105 Id. 
106 Johnson, 515 U.S. at 316–17. 
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cause district court judges make such decisions all the time.107  As the 
Johnson Court explained, “the issue here at stake—the existence, or 
nonexistence, of a triable issue of fact—is the kind of issue that trial 
judges, not appellate judges, confront almost daily.  Institutionally 
speaking, appellate judges enjoy no comparative expertise in such 
matters.”108  As Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens articulated 
in his Scott dissent, it is likely that a genuine issue of material fact ex-
ists if the appellate court disagrees with the district court, and thus, 
the matter should be left to the jury anyway.109 
Next, Judge Sutton’s interpretation makes it extremely difficult 
for litigants to recover when bringing constitutional tort claims under 
§ 1983, straying from the original purpose of § 1983 to hold officials 
liable for constitutional violations.110  Qualified immunity, although 
meant to protect officials, must also take into account “society’s and a 
constitutionally injured plaintiff’s interest in seeking redress for viola-
tions of clearly established law.”111  Scholars argue that courts often 
lose sight of this backdrop.112  Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, in ana-
lyzing the Supreme Court’s October 2013 term, which included the 
Plumhoff v. Rickard decision, argues that recent decisions “show a 
Court that is very protective of government officials who are sued for 
money damages, and that has made it very difficult for victims of con-
 
107 See Appealability—Summary Judgment Order—Qualified Immunity Defense, 10 Fed. Litig. 154, 
155 (1995) (stating that district judges confront such issues almost daily). 
108 Johnson, 515 U.S. at 316.  Because appeals of summary judgment orders are seen as pre-
senting questions of law, the standard of appellate review is de novo.  See generally 10A 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 2716 (3d ed. 2012).  
Nevertheless, the Johnson Court correctly pointed out that district judges are more expe-
rienced than appellate judges at determining whether a genuine issue of fact exists for 
purposes of qualified immunity summary judgment orders.  Johnson, 515 U.S. at 316.  The 
idea that review of qualified immunity decisions is de novo, therefore, seems like a waste 
of appellate resources.  The problem lies in the fact that courts view qualified immunity 
decisions as pure questions of law, when this often remains a fiction.  While questions 
about the content of clearly established law may be purely legal, there are other questions 
that require courts to review more of a mixed question, such as whether under the cir-
cumstances, it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that his actions violated the 
law.  When such a mixed question exists, scholars have argued that “it would be anoma-
lous to let a defendant force both a district court and an appeals court to pore over a 
complex record to decide whether the evidence is sufficient to go to a jury, when the 
practical solution in hard cases is simply to hold the jury trial.”  Rudovsky, supra note 1, at 
71. 
109 Scott, 550 U.S. at  397 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
110 See Rudovsky, supra note 1, at 23 n.2 (discussing purpose of § 1983). 
111 Urbonya, supra note 27, at 11. 
112 See, e.g., Rudovsky, supra note 1, at 78 (“The Court increasingly perceives the issue from 
the side of the official-perpetrator.”). 
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stitutional violations to recover.”113  If appellate jurisdiction were as 
available as Judge Sutton suggests, officials would get a second chance 
to be granted qualified immunity almost every time it was denied, 
making it more challenging for a plaintiff to succeed. 
Broadening the appealability standard provides officials with a se-
cond chance to succeed on summary judgment and makes it less like-
ly, by definition, that plaintiffs will have the opportunity to appear be-
fore a jury.  Professor Jeffrey Stempel criticizes cases that make 
summary judgment easier to obtain and argues that these cases un-
dermine core values, including “the infusion of community standards 
into litigation; promoting public confidence in the judicial system 
and fairness of litigation results; maintaining democratic values of 
participation; and citizen access to the system.”114  Expanding appeal-
ability of summary judgment denials of qualified immunity orders 
may, therefore, threaten the legitimacy of the judicial system.115 
Furthermore, if the judge decides a case on summary judgment, 
juries will never get to decide questions of historical fact.  Judge Sut-
ton’s approach highlights a problem that Justice Stevens recognized 
in his dissent in Scott v. Harris.  Justice Stevens suggested that if the in-
terpretation of facts is controversial, it should be left to a jury, not an 
appellate court, to look at the factual record and determine whether 
the official acted reasonably.116  He also added that the Court in Scott 
“usurped the jury’s fact-finding function” and explained that, “[i]f 
two groups of judges can disagree so vehemently about the nature of 
the pursuit and the circumstances surrounding that pursuit, it seems 
eminently likely that a reasonable juror could disagree with this 
Court’s characterization of events.”117  Judge Sutton’s approach would 
allow four federal judges to review the facts underlying the plaintiff’s 
complaint, making it very difficult for plaintiffs’ claims to reach a jury 
even when factual disputes exist. 
Moreover, the ability of a defendant to appeal a qualified immuni-
ty summary judgment denial stacks the deck for the defendants, and 
is therefore unfair to plaintiffs.  Although plaintiffs can appeal sum-
mary judgment orders based on qualified immunity just as defend-
ants can (because the district court decision then becomes a final or-
 
113 Erwin Chemerinsky, Appearances Can Be Deceiving:  October Term 2013 Moved the Law to the 
Right, 17 GREEN BAG 2D 389, 403 (2014). 
114 Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror:  The Supreme Court’s Shimmering View of Summary 
Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Value of Adjudication, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 166 (1988). 
115 Id. 
116 Scott, 550 U.S. at 396 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
117 Id. at 395–96. 
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der), plaintiffs have a higher burden to begin with in § 1983 cases.  
First, § 1983 claims have been “sharply curtailed by . . . a redefinition 
of some constitutional deprivations, injection of notions of ‘culpabil-
ity’ beyond those normally imposed by tort law, and a back-door ex-
haustion requirement . . . .”118  Next, because the plaintiff is usually 
paying a contingent fee for representation, and has often been in-
jured because of the claim he is asserting, the delays of litigation usu-
ally cause much more harm to the plaintiff than to the defendant.119  
Thus, if a plaintiff succeeds in clearing the difficult hurdles in the ini-
tial summary judgment stage, it becomes detrimental when defend-
ants are able to appeal the summary judgment denial based on quali-
fied immunity. 
Scholars have argued that even if defendants denied qualified 
immunity on summary judgment were unable to appeal, they would 
simply move for judgment as a matter of law after presenting their 
case or after the jury decision.  In turn, these scholars argue, appel-
late courts would end up applying the same test as on summary 
judgment,120 but after resources have been wasted in trial.121  Never-
theless, other scholars have responded by explaining there is a large 
difference in context when judges decide summary judgment orders 
 
118 Rudovsky, supra note 1, at 26 (citations omitted). 
119 Id. at 70 (“[D]elays and costs involved are usually a far more significant burden for the 
plaintiff.”). 
120 Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a) (“(a) JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. (1) In General.  If a 
party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a rea-
sonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on 
that issue, the court may:  (A) resolve the issue against the party; and (B) grant a motion 
for judgment as a matter of law against the party on a claim or defense that, under the 
controlling law, can be maintained or defeated only with a favorable finding on that is-
sue.”) with FED R. CIV. P. 56 (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant 
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.”). 
121 See also 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 25, at § 3905.1 (“An order denying summary 
judgment is reviewable on appeal from summary judgment for the opposing party, but 
ordinarily should not be reviewable if a trial has been had.  Once a trial has been held, 
the question on appeal should be the sufficiency of the evidence adduced at trial.  Even if 
it had been wrong to deny summary judgment, summary judgment procedure is not de-
signed to confer a prize on the party who is correct as a matter of the pretrial record.  A 
factually supported judgment of judge or jury must be sustained, even if it proves wrong 
the prediction that should have been made at the time of a pretrial motion for summary 
judgment.  Review of the summary judgment issue might possibly be appropriate if the 
trial evidence was not sufficient to support a judgment but some procedural error fore-
closed direct review of the sufficiency issue, but if there is any significant difference be-
tween the summary judgment record and the trial record it may be more orderly to re-
mand for renewed consideration of summary judgment based on the trial record.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
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and motions for judgment as a matter of law.122  Professor Arthur Mil-
ler explains that there is a fundamental difference between a paper 
record and a trial record because “in the former context[] the judge 
decides what is fact, law, or the application of fact to law without the 
benefit of hearing fully developed testimonial evidence in a trial set-
ting.”123  Although judges are not supposed to evaluate the credibility 
of witnesses or weigh contradicting evidence when deciding a motion 
for judgment as a matter of law,124 the trial can provide clarity on 
whether there are genuine issues of fact and realistically, the judge 
will not be able to completely decide the motion without considering 
what was stated on the trial record.  Furthermore, if the motion for 
judgment as a matter of law is brought after a jury trial, there is likely 
to be more deference to the jury decision.  Even Judge Sutton 
acknowledged this in his Romo opinion, stating that:  “[W]hile the 
summary judgment record and the jury record often will differ, they 
normally will differ in ways that make it more difficult for an officer 
to win on appeal, as the appellate court will be asked to second guess 
not just inferences that could be drawn from a paper record but in-
ferences that may be drawn from eyeballing the witnesses as well.”125 
Thus, although my approach has shortcomings, namely that ap-
pellate courts will need to continue line drawing between questions 
of fact and questions of law and will need to apply a more cumber-
some test than Judge Sutton’s broad appealability standard, the alter-
native approach has too many disadvantages.  Granting jurisdiction to 
almost all qualified immunity summary judgment denials, as Judge 
Sutton advocates, will result in a crowded the appellate docket, litiga-
tion delays, and a limited ability of plaintiffs to have their constitu-
tional tort claims heard by a jury.  A limited appealability standard, 
on the other hand, would lend greater respect to the district court’s 
qualified immunity determinations, lead to a wiser use of appellate 
 
122 See, Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment:  Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability 
Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 982, 1061 (2003) (asserting that there are different systemic implications when 
summary judgment is relied upon versus when judges decide motions for judgment as a 
matter of law). 
123 Id.  
124 Id. at 1057–58 (“Three basic restrictive rules that judges traditionally have followed on the 
motion are that the evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-
movant, the credibility of witnesses is not to be evaluated, and contradicting evidence is 
not to be weighed.” (footnotes omitted)). 
125 Romo, 723 F.3d at 683 (Sutton, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (emphasis 
omitted). 
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resources, and foster legitimacy by not dismissing all constitutional 
claims on summary judgment grounds. 
CONCLUSION  
While the recent Supreme Court decisions following Scott v. Harris 
seem to contradict the appealability standard in Johnson v. Jones, the 
case law can be reconciled.  Although some lower appellate courts 
have dealt with the case law by expanding the appealability of quali-
fied immunity summary judgment orders, I argue that a limited read-
ing is more appropriate.  A limited appellate standard is the best way 
to balance the competing policies implicated by qualified immunity 
appeals, such as the ability of victims of constitutional violations to 
recover, the final decision principle, and the government interest in 
protecting only officials who act reasonably.  As pressure mounts to 
monitor and limit police misconduct, one way to start is by limiting 
the number of chances officials get to achieve immunity through the 
judicial process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

